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OF METHODS AND GOALS

The opening panel presentation at the conference that spawned this issue of
Law and Contemporary Problems described innovations at several law schools
in the traditional survey course in legal ethics. As moderator of that presentation, I suggested the following diagram as a summary of the issues that ought
to be addressed in redesigning that course:
Structure
Style/Technique
OUTCOME
Substance
I also observed, however, that although the panelists' papers had much to say
about the topics on the left of the diagram-for example, whether the course
should be two or three credit hours, be compressed within a short time or
spread over a semester, be offered in the first year of law school or required in
later years, use traditional case analysis or rely on new forms of instruction, urge
a particular moral perspective or be more agnostic, and so on-they had rather
little to say about the important matter to the right.
Remaining largely implicit for much of the conference was a fundamental
issue: What are we trying to produce with this strong emphasis on inculcating
ethical values (or at least an appreciation of ethical values) into law students?
Better lawyers? How so? Nicer Lawyers? How so and why? Happier
Lawyers? Happier Clients? Or is the point a better, nicer legal system? Or a
better, nicer, happier society? I returned to this issue at the end of the
conference by noting that even after two days of very impressive conversation,
it was still unclear to me how the conference attendees would answer the
"outcome" question.
This relative inattention is significant (although not disastrous) because one's
goal can often determine one's methods. And the more distinct the goals at
stake, the more difficult it will be for educators to generate any consensus on
a course's structure, style, and substance. The conference, it seems to me,
demonstrated this phenomenon, even among scholars who were all committed
to "improving" legal ethics training.
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II
COMPETING "OLD" AND "NEW" MORAL PERSPECTIVES

The W.M. Keck Foundation has funded a wide range of different kinds of
instructional efforts that reflect-but also disguise-a subtle underlying competition between two alternative visions of what this enhanced teaching is supposed
to achieve. One has its roots in the past, the basic message of which is that the
legal profession once had a sense of ethics to which current practitioners and
students should return and perhaps improve. The other has its foundation in
the present, and its basic message is that ethics training is part of a modern
effort to create something new within the practice of law that will help revitalize
and justify it. These differing perspectives in turn produce two very different
teaching approaches. The first, in an effort to understand legal ethics, elevates
the importance of the history and current context of law practice; the latter
demotes these elements and instead emphasizes contemporary moral and
political philosophy. Most conference participants seemed to be committed to
the latter vision and teaching approach, but without much thought concerning
implications for the relationship between law schools and law practice.
Despite this important underlying difference between types of ethics courses,
all the programs described at the conference nevertheless share an equally
important characteristic: They are motivated by an intuition that typical law
school ethics training, which is usually mired myopically in rules of acceptable
behavior, is insufficient to produce either the improved old thing or the
refreshing new thing. Everyone seems to concede that the rules of legal ethics
are necessarily incomplete in their guidance and inspiration. What everyone is
seeking to produce, then, is a vague condition of mind within which these ethics
rules should be learned, interpreted, and applied. I call this particular
propensity "ethics with an attitude"; practicing lawyers generally refer to
something like it as "professionalism." 1 Yet, whatever it might be labeled, it

is considered the factor capable of resuscitating the morality of lawyering.
If this is true, then the directions of Keck Foundation philanthropy regarding
legal ethics should change. But not because the Foundation's previous efforts
have been misguided. The problem the Foundation now confronts is a function
of its success: There seems little more it can do in the law school arena that
would not simply repeat or overlap unnecessarily with efforts it has already
launched. For example, the Foundation has already helped law schools create
ample videotape-based training programs and other innovative teaching
materials to enrich ethics courses generally. These materials now need to be
1. Professionalism is not synonymous with this attitude, however, because "professionalism" is
usually understood by lawyers either very superficially or more narrowly than the outcome the
conference participants have in mind. A host of recent articles demonstrate this point in various ways,
and many have been assembled into a book by the organizer of this conference, Professor Thomas
Metzloff of Duke University School of Law. See THOMAS B. METZLOFF, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANTHOLOGY

(1994).
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distributed more widely rather than increased in amount or sophistication, a task
that can and should be handled by others. The Foundation should instead turn
its attention to a different set of challenges and opportunities involving legal
ethics and the future of the legal profession.
III
LAW PRACTICE VERSUS LAW SCHOOLS

The educational emphasis for the Keck Foundation should shift to the busy
practitioner. In these circumstances, the topic of professional responsibility is
no longer theoretical and about other people; it is tangible, immediate, and
personal. Here, attitude-at least as much as rules-determines the real nature
of legal ethics. Here, then, the legal profession will ultimately succeed or fail
in regaining and maintaining some semblance of social respectability.
Yet here, unfortunately, is also where law schools have their least interest.
For reasons too numerous and complex to sort out in this brief comment, a
significant and troubling division has developed between law schools and law
practice, fueled by mutual attitudes of disdain, with each side attending to
separate agendas that few have any interest in integrating. This division needs
to be reduced in general, but particularly regarding the basic moral expectations
of and within the profession. On this point, the Keck Foundation has already
been helpful. For example, it financially assisted law schools in developing the
videotape training materials mentioned above, which have become as popular
with practicing lawyers at continuing legal education ("CLE") programs as with
law students in their ethics courses. But many more steps of this kind are
needed, with a specific eye to developing programs aimed principally at
practitioners, and secondarily at students. Some efforts of this sort have already
begun to emerge within various bar organizations.
Yet this modest, fledgling development among practicing lawyers itself raises
some interesting questions for the Keck Foundation and other eleemosynary
institutions. Even if everyone agreed that a fruitful place for ethics instruction
would be CLE programs, a separate issue is whether philanthropic organizations
ought to be involved in the Bar's effort to resurrect its reputation. One could
reasonably argue, after all, that if ethics training is important to practicing
lawyers, then they will, or ought to, use their own considerable resources to
create it. Although to some extent they have, the real problem here is the same
one that causes charitable foundations to become heavily involved in funding
basic scientific research and educational institutions generally: These activities
need philanthropic support because they have little immediate market appeal
that would cause ordinary economic forces to fund them adequately.
Foundations, then, help cure a kind of basic market failure-a strong tendency
for investors to shy away from projects with very long-term, speculative pay-offs,
particularly pay-offs that cannot be captured by the investors themselves. CLE
training generally, and legal ethics training in particular, is in this circumstance.
It needs the support of organizations with long-range, socially conscious perspectives
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Although a change in the Keck Foundation's focus from law students to law
practitioners would be both uniquely useful to the profession and fully justified,
accomplishing this move raises another set of problems more practical than
orientational. The Foundation could, for example, simply solicit program
proposals from various bar associations or other lawyer organizations with
special interests in ethics.2 But this would force the Foundation, rather
uncomfortably, I think, to consider a host of proposals from non-traditional and
less easily monitored sources. Instead, another route would be more manageable for the Foundation and more beneficial for the legal profession.
IV
TOWARD JOINT PROJECTS

The administrative challenge to the Foundation is to address two problems
simultaneously, and to do so without significantly changing the way it currently
conducts its philanthropic business through grants to traditional educational
institutions. The two problems are those on which I have focused here. The
first is one that the Foundation already appreciates and, not surprisingly,
captured most of the attention at the conference: the perception that the
practice of law is losing its moral integrity and social stature. The second, less
obvious problem is the one I believe diminishes the practical impact of the
Foundation's law school-based projects: the unhealthy, and sometimes
antagonistic separation between law school and law practice. If practitioners
continue to lack interest in academic efforts, innovative ethics instruction in law
schools will not have the kind of lasting value the Foundation might expect.
A possible solution might adopt the following pattern. For the Foundation
to accomplish several objectives simultaneously-to continue its appropriate
emphasis on the moral foundations of law practice, to enhance the potential
impact of programs it has already funded, and to continue to rely upon
educational institutions as the principal source and locus of new projects-it
should require the next generation of law-related grant proposals to be from law
schools willing to establish a joint effort between themselves and bar organizations or some other kind of practice group. To that end, the Foundation should
announce that its requirements will not be satisfied by any law school program
that focuses primarily, or even initially, on law students, including programs that
involve a few noted practicing lawyers and programs that the school ultimately
intends to "sell" to practicing lawyers or bar groups for use in CLE contexts.

2. Georgia has produced one good example. A decade ago, the Chief Justice of the Georgia
Supreme Court created "The Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism," which is independent of
the State Bar of Georgia, and charged it with the singular responsibility of fostering CLE training in
professionalism (that is, some version of ethics with an attitude), including the creation of new and
innovative teaching materials. The Commission is funded by special CLE fees paid by members of the
State Bar for their annual professionalism training. The Commission's board of directors is composed
principally of practicing lawyers and a few judges, but also includes representatives from each of
Georgia's law schools.
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Instead, any proposed program, as initially conceived and structured, would
have to reflect a collective and collaborative effort of legal academics and law
practitioners, with one evident goal being to have the perspectives of each
enhance and enrich the other.
An Emory Law School alumnus recently established just such a collaborative
effort with the "Institute for General Counsel Studies," which will be housed at
Emory but run by various general counsel of corporations and government
agencies around the country. The purpose of the Institute will be to fund
studies and conferences focused on the unique ethical demands imposed on
general counsel because of the unusual hybrid position they occupy as lawyers
for and part of management of the same companies. All Institute activities are
expected to involve the joint efforts of general counsel, law professors, and law
students, and to include corporate CEOs as well to help educate them
concerning the nature of in-house lawyering. The Institute would therefore
bridge the academic-practitioner divide as well as the law-business dichotomy.
Its overall theme will be ethical responsibility, in both the legal and business
arenas.
Because this kind of project emphasizes the subtle factors I have stressed
here-attitude and circumstances-it ought to be of particular interest to
foundations endeavoring to have a significant impact on the ethics of lawyering.
Lawyers especially understand that rules alone mean little; only in context do
they really matter. This insight has in fact been central to virtually all of the
innovative law school teaching projects the Keck Foundation has already
funded. It is time to transfer these lessons more directly into the profession,
and to help law schools and bar associations fulfill their joint responsibility for
doing so.

